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pie, Culler shows diat genetic semiology seeks to gain insight into the meaning of poetry
by considering how poets write whde descriptive semiology is concerned with die way a
poem gets interpreted by critics as well as what conventions make possible disagreements
among critics about the meaning of a poem.
In "A Problem of Audience" Andrew A. Tadie and James P. Mesa demonstrate
descriptive semiotics. Their problem is: What made it possible for a contemporary of
Davenant to understand the Deistic theme of the Seige ofRhodes? The auuiors discover that
die clue to die meaning is found in Davenant's divergence from his favored Terencian
Five-Act Structure of English drama. By introducing a disruptive element into an
accepted dieatrical format, Davenant signaled to die astute among die audience diat diere
was a deeper structure of meaning in the play.
Leon Satterfield provides an example of genetic semiotics in "Toward a Poetics of
Ironic Sign." In order that irony may be understood when it occurs, Satterfield shows how
die kind of irony that implies an ironist is created. On the one hand, he describes the types
of irony (rhetorical and situational) he is concerned with and oudines the clues given by
die author diat make the recognition of irony possible. On the odier hand, Satterfield pro-
vides some insights into what die auuior betrays about himself when he writes in an ironic
mode. The essay successfully demonstrates why irony is easily missed or misunderstood
by the reader.
Finally, a critical note: Tzvetan Todorov outlines Bakhtin's resistance to the language
of technology for discussing communication, which uses such terms as "encoding/
decoding," "addresser/addressee," and "context/message." Instead, Bakhtin prefers the
more fluid connotations of "speaker," "auditor," "utterance," and "intertext," which imply
the social nature of communication.
Todorov's point hits a nerve in Western semiotics, philosophy of language, literary
criticism, and diis collection. Indeed, most of die essays in this volume assume a model of
communication derived from the technology of electronic communication, where a sender
codes a message and telegraphs it to a receiver who decodes it. According to Todorov,
Bakhtin opposes diis view and proposes that communication is an intimate relationship, a
communion of persons Üiat cannot be explained or described in a way analogous to elec-
tronic communication. The difference between Bakhtin and his Western contemporaries
is diat of an organic or social model of communication versus a technological or analytic
one.
Florida StateUniversityParrish W. Jones
Pursuits ofHappiness: The Hollywood Comedy ofRemarriage, by
Stanley Cavell; 283 pp. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981, $17.50.
Why might a phdosopher who has been interested in such diings as skepticism, private
languages, Thoreau, the third Critique, and King Lear now write a book consisting of
Reviews141
readings of seven comedies made in Hollywood between 1934 and 1949? What could the
works of Capra, Cukor, Hawks, Sturges, and McCarey have to do with those of
Shakespeare, Kant, and Wittgenstein?
Cavell's effort has long been to map die tremsformations of the human attempt to
discover objects — for example, Platonic forms, private introspectible innate ideas, or
natural phenomena which disclose God's action — inherently revelatory of die natures of
diings, especially of die nature of a life worth living, and to suggest diat die worth of a life
(or a practice or a work of art) must and can be reckoned in the absence of such a
discovery, diough such reckonings wUl themselves remain open to criticism. Attempts to
discover once and for all the conditions of a worthwhde life are themselves understandable
as reflections of fantasies of freeing oneself from reckoning and of the finite human nature
which gives rise to such fantasies.
Suppose we take up Cavell's suggestion. How might we carry out die sort of reckoning
of the worth of a life which Cavell claims is possible? We might "retain the idea of
ourselves as created and attempt further to humanize diis creation, identifying ourselves
now as the creators of ourselves, since obviously no other being could be eligible for such a
role." Achieving happiness whde so understanding ourselves would require us, as he puts
it in The Claim of Reason, "to accept responsibility for ourselves in particular ... to con-
sent to our present state as somediing we desire, or anyway, desire more dian we desire
change" (p. 465).
What makes die movies Cavell considers in Pursuits of Happiness interesting to him is
that their leading characters manage seriously to question and finally to consent to their
present states. They succeed in taking "a new step in die creation of the human" (p. 65).
The question which, Cavell says, is "all but continually" on Cary Grant's mind in Bringing
Up Baby is "what am I doing here, diat is, how have I got into diis relation and why do I
stay in it?" (p. 130). Grant's question, or some transformation of it, surfaces in each of the
seven comedies Cavell reads. "The overarching question of the comedies of remarriage is
precisely the question of what constitutes a union, what makes these two into one, what
binds, you may say what sanctifies in marriage" (p. 53), and, further, what makes for
happiness in a human life generally.
The kind of relation — remarriage — achieved and accepted by Colbert and Gable,
Grant and Hepburn, Fonda and Stanwyck, and other couples requires adventurousness
and inventiveness, the recovery or invention by the couple of a shared chddhood, their
transportation to an extraordinary world, often Connecticut, in which their fantasies can
be realized and confronted (cp. Shakespeare's forests), uieir confusion (indicative of
reciprocity) of active and passive roles, and in general the achievement of "purposiveness
without purpose" (p. 113), as though shared joyfulness in pursuing nothing at present
could guarantee shared joyfulness in pursuing anything in the future. "The happiness in
diese comedies is honorable" (p. 65) — the criteria of happiness diey propose are worth
taking seriously — insofar as they succeed in "showing us our fantasies" (p. 18), in making
their wishes and avoidances and inventions recognizable to us as imaginably like our
own.
There is nouiing in Pursuits of Happiness like a demonstrative argument to show die
necessary and sufficient conditions for human happiness in all circumstances. But to the
extent diat phdosophizing requires conversation with odiers about matters of common
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interest, Cavell's talk about happiness in these movies is surpassed in depdi and interest
by very litde contemporary writing.
SwarthmoreCollegeRichard Eldridge
The Nature ofCriticism, by Colin Radford and Sally Minogue; ?
& 180 pp. Adantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1981, $30.00.
The Nature of Criticism is packed with arguments, many of which are concerned widi
investigating die precise nature of specific critical claims advanced by well-known writers
such as René Wellek and F. R. Leavis. Radford and Minogue know both literature and
criticism better than many phUosophers of art, and, unlike most uieorists, are wüling
themselves to engage in criticism and to chide critics for mistedcen readings and Ul-
supported interpretations. Because of its unusual — and largely successful — "case study"
approach, its wdlingness to consider diverse aspects of criticism, its detailed, fine-grained
examination of the logic of critical judgments and arguments, and its philosophically
sophisticated but accessible treatment of its topics, The Nature of Criticism is well worth
reading.
The first chapter, "The Complexities of Critical Judgements," attempts to show that
even such banal classificatory judgments as "Hamlet is a tragedy" harbor hidden moral
assumptions emd "cem be evaluative in various complex ways" (pp. 9- 10). It also examines
the presuppositions of representative interpretive claims in order to determine the critical
admissibility of information external to the text. This leads naturally to a discussion of die
nature of critical arguments, with the relation between a feature cited by a critic in an
argument, and its effect (on the critic and on us, as readers of the text and die criticism in
question) being die primary object of attention. Differences between scientific and critical
arguments are noted (p. 49), and it is urged that the basis for the objective idiom in
criticism is agreement in our critical responses.
The case study method is at its best in the extensive, detaded analysis of Christopher
Ricks's interpretation of part of Tennyson's In Memoriam. Many of die ideas previously
introduced — many not noted above — are put to work here, and other new ideas, such as
die view diat die normative dimension of critical arguments does not preclude but radier
presupposes a causal dimension, are advanced and argued for. If anydiing can serve to
demonstrate diat "critical arguments are frequently complex, elusive and rhetorically
misleading as to their true nature, very diverse, and often dubious" (p. 1 14), it is Radford
and Minogue's long, complicated, and subde discussion.
Anodier question taken up by Radford and Minogue asks whether diere are any
necessary conditions for excellence in eirt. Both Clive Bell's and Monroe Beardsle/s views
are considered, dien rejected, and Beardsley^ definition of aesthetic experience is also
objected to, being criticized as both too narrow emd "eccentric." Radford and Minogue
conclude that it is unlikely that there are any substantive criteria of excellence in art.
